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ABSTRACT: Recent work linking feminist epistemology with social epistemology draws attention to the 
role of status and power in understanding knowledge and reasoning in social context. I argue that 
considerations of social justice require better understandings of two particular components of reasoning and 
social context: (i) abstraction—who gets to abstract, how, and why? (ii) the individual-social distinction—
how do particular understandings of this distinction serve to minimize or elucidate the role of status and 
power? 
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Significant developments in feminist epistemology and social epistemology have drawn 
attention to the importance of examinations of social and cultural context in the 
development of enhanced understandings of knowledge, reasoning, and logic. Feminist 
epistemology is regularly understood as a form of social epistemology, one that places 
special emphasis on the epistemic workings of gender and other politically-sensitive 
social divisions. Feminist epistemologists focus particularly on forms of social identity 
that interact with locally salient forms of power and status that may, in turn, inform 
conceptions of knowledge, reasoning, and logic. However, the particular focus on 
understanding the epistemic workings of power and status that feminist theorists develop 
places their work at odds somewhat (in dissensus perhaps) with many projects in social 
epistemology that encompass the social as a relatively apolitical realm. I want to 
elaborate on this tension and, in particular, examine some of the ways in which feminist 
work that takes account of power/status uniquely contributes to theoretical 
understandings of cognition, reasoning, and logic. I will argue, in particular, that this 
work motivates (among other things) specific reconsiderations of two important 
concepts--and related distinctions--that inform work on cognition, reasoning, logic, and 
social context: abstraction or the abstract (as that is contrasted with the concrete, the 
particulars of context); and the social (as that is distinguished from the individual). 
It is important to understand the term feminist here as something like an umbrella 
term that includes a range of projects. While many earlier projects in feminist theorizing 
took gender (as demarcated primarily by sex differences) to be the central concept for 
analysis, it soon became clear that the concept needed to be refined and extended in 
various ways. For example, it became evident that gender could not be examined in 
isolation from race, class, and other salient social and cultural differences that inform 
social identity and, indeed, inform the ways in which gender impacts individual 
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experience and identity in a given social context. Social identity can be understood in 
terms of differences in experiences and behavior. Yet since there are innumerable ways in 
which any one individual differs from another, differences and identity can be examined 
along various axes of significance, some of which reveal the workings of power and 
status and some of which may not.  
Earlier psychological analyses also tended to treat gender as an attribute of 
individuals, with gender differences understood in terms of differences in relatively stable 
intrapsychic psychological and behavioral traits. More recent feminist work in cognitive 
psychology has drawn attention to the situational nature of gender which prompts more 
refined understandings of “situated cognition.” Even in laboratory settings with tests of 
what I call IISAP-cognition (isolated-individual-solving-a puzzle-cognition), gender 
differences can appear and disappear depending on the particular social effects, 
associations, and expectations prompted by changes in test formats and test instructions. 
(Sharps et al. 1993, Deaux 1984, Rooney 1995) Postmodern and rhetorical analyses of 
gender have also revealed its workings as a symbolic and discursive formation. For 
example, in the history of philosophy reason was often valued through an implicit, if not 
explicit, contrast with the lower-status realm of emotion, particulars, and embodiment 
that was metaphorically, if not literally, cast as the realm of the “feminine.” (Rooney 
1991) In the following I will draw on these more recent expanded understandings of 
gender, that is, gender understood as a social and symbolic formation linked to power 
and status. I am especially interested in the ways in which these expanded understandings 
of gender motivate enhanced understandings of reasoning and social and political 
context.  
The relatively well-know case of gender and moral reasoning provides a helpful 
illustration of what is at issue here. Carol Gilligan’s 1982 work In a Different Voice 
provided the catalyst for significant debate in feminist psychology and feminist 
philosophy especially. Gilligan herself and many of her commentators regularly framed 
different moral voices in terms of gender differences in reasoning (“care reasoning” and 
“justice reasoning”) which drew on a particular understanding of the abstract versus 
context/concrete distinction. Not uncommon is Marilyn Friedman’s description of the 
difference: 
 
the standard, more typically “male,” moral voice...derives moral judgments about particular cases 
from abstract, universalized moral rules and principles that are substantively concerned with 
justice and rights. ... By contrast, the different, more characteristically “female,” moral voice that 
Gilligan heard in her studies eschews abstract rules and principles...[it] derives moral judgments 
from the contextual detail of situations grasped as specific and unique... the motivating vision of 
this ethics is “that everyone will be responded to and included, that no one will be left alone or 
hurt.” (Friedman 1993, p. 92, my emphasis) 
 
As I have argued in more detail elsewhere (Rooney 2001) one needs to be careful about 
reading or “hearing” differences in terms of a distinction (abstract versus contextual) that 
draws on, rather than challenges, a philosophical history of reason that inspired rather 
than challenged sexism spelled out in terms of “fundamental” cognitive differences. For 
instance, Schopenhauer noted: “For it is just because [women’s] reasoning power is weak 
that present circumstances have such a hold over them, and those concrete things which 
lie directly before their eyes exercise a power which is seldom counteracted to any extent 
by abstract principles of thought, fixed rules of conduct... or regard of what is absent and 
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remote.” (Mahowald 1994, 138). If there are some differences emerging in the moral 
voices of women and men (and there has been considerable debate about the existence or 
significance of such) one could alternatively read them in terms of the application of 
different kinds of universal and abstract principles. One could well argue that what 
Friedman calls the “motivating vision” of the care ethic is a universal principle, perhaps 
even an abstract one. The meaning of the term “abstract” is not as transparent as is often 
assumed in these discussions. Abstraction is surely something of a relative or contextual 
notion--as when we abstract from some of the specifics or saliencies of a given situation, 
and not others. Abstracting from a moral situation with respect to the kinds of 
relationships among individuals in it, and not with respect to specific juridical rights of 
those individuals as autonomous agents, is one way of abstracting from the situation, as is 
the way that abstracts with respect to the latter and not the former. It is, unfortunately, the 
traditional affinity between conceptions or idealizations of “maleness” and rationality 
(typically fleshed in terms of principles, autonomy, and abstraction) that seems to 
automatically lend voice to certain ways of reading gender differences in these contexts 
and not alternative ways that, I am suggesting, are just as plausible. What I am arguing 
for here is a feminist reading that troubles traditional conceptions of abstraction linked to 
a particular aspect of the symbolic formation of gender-- the traditional “masculine” 
reach of reason was regularly posited as the superior cognitive mode through a contrast 
with, and abstraction from, the clearly “lower status” world of particulars and 
embodiment which was regularly symbolized as “feminine” (Rooney 1991,1994)  
The particular interrogation of abstraction that I promote here also connects to the 
debate generated by Andrea Nye’s influential work, Words of Power: A Feminist Reading 
of the History of Logic (1990). Nye’s examination of historical developments in logic 
uncovers aspects of their discursive constructions as “words of power” that legitimate 
some ways of thinking and speaking as authoritative and others as not. In many cases 
Nye sees the feminist problem with logic as “the problem of abstraction”—the problem 
of privileging formal abstraction as the superior mode of thought, thus dismissing or 
erasing the content and context of real everyday utterances. However, there is a tendency 
for Nye (among others) to, again, treat the abstract-context distinction (which she 
connects with the form-content distinction) as a meaningful distinction without giving 
due attention to the ways in which its meaningfulness draws on its gender-inflected 
discursive history. She then tends to identify the feminist problem of logic with the 
problem of abstraction, to the point that she questions whether there even could be a 
feminist reform of logic.  
In her discussion of Nye’s work Marjorie Hass (1999) takes issue with Nye’s 
understanding of logic and abstraction and her tendency to hold up natural language(s) as 
logic’s purer other. Addressing patterns of discrimination in particular experience, Hass 
argues, often requires specific forms of generality and abstraction. For instance, feminist 
criticism of cultural and social norms often requires abstraction from particular 
relationships or particular linguistic systems. Hass does not deny that there are problems 
with abstraction in some contexts—not recognizing individual differences, for instance, 
but she adds: “In aiming to avoid the recognizable problems with abstractions, we must 
not imagine that we can retreat into a “purer,” fully concrete form of description…natural 
language itself requires a form of generality that produces anew the problem of 
abstraction.” (1999, 193) Hass presents a more nuanced approach to abstraction that is 
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reflected also in her consideration of alternative logics which may enable “new 
representation of generality that are respectful of difference.” (194) Val Plumwood 
stresses a similar point in relation to feminist critiques of logic: 
 
Once the plurality of logical systems has been acknowledged, feminist and other social critique 
can be more discriminating in its response to logics, and begin an exploration of the way in which 
different logical systems correspond to different forms of rationality. We can begin to understand 
systems of logic and their corresponding systems of rationality as selected… I shall show that an 
understanding of the way selection has operated to privilege certain of these forms of rationality 
has much to contribute to an understanding of the deep roots of phallocentrism and other 
oppressive conceptual structures in Western thought, and that we can find in the selection of 
logical systems the same marks of elite perspectives which have been widely demonstrated 
elsewhere for supposedly neutral and universal forms of knowledge. (2002, 17) 
 
(Plumwood then proceeds to undertake a specific examination of negation in classical 
logic--in particular, its relation to hierarchical dualisms and what she calls the “logic of 
domination.”) Thus, for both Hass and Plumwood the “political” questions are not 
primarily about the privileging of abstraction or logic over context and particularity, but, 
instead, are about the privileging of particular forms of abstraction or logic over others. 
Given that there are numerous ways in which one might abstract from and reason about a 
given context or situation, questions then arise about who gets to abstract and why, as 
well as questions about which particular aspects of social contexts individual forms of 
abstraction reveal and which aspects they render invisible or “illogical.” How, in 
particular, do supposedly neutral and universal forms of logic and knowledge reflect elite 
perspectives, where these perspectives are understood as particular social perspectives 
informed by status and power? 
These recommendations for politically-sensitive attention to contexts and 
situations and the various ways in which one might abstract from them necessitate, I 
maintain, a particular feminist examination of the social (as that is distinguished from the 
individual), especially since that has also been a significant distinction in the history of 
epistemology. Most, arguably all, contexts and situations are social ones which can be 
experienced and understood quite differently by people whose identities place them in 
different social locations--even within the same situation. (What may seem to be a 
harmless joke to one person in a given context may be offensive sexism or racism to 
another, for instance.) As we have seen, expanded understandings of gender as a social 
and symbolic formation (that impacts epistemological as well as economic and 
institutional structures) challenges uncritical feminist rejections of abstraction as 
“masculine.” So too must such understandings reject an uncritical endorsement of the 
social as “feminine.” In particular, I will argue that a more critical examination of the 
individual-social distinction as a gender-inflicted one must also inform accounts of what 
is especially significant about feminist epistemology and feminist perspectives on logic, 
including what distinguishes this work from many projects in “regular” social 
epistemology. The individual versus social and abstract versus concrete/context 
distinctions are not the same, of course, but there are significant links between them in 
traditional epistemology. Many forms of epistemic individualism which take individual 
knowers as the primary epistemic agents construct those agents as generic subjects with 
generic capacities to abstract and reason about the “core” meaning and epistemic 
structure of particular, socially-imbued knowledge contexts and situations. 
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Recognizing that the individual-social distinction has also been a gender-linked 
one doesn’t simply mean noting that women’s individuality was often negated or 
discouraged, that women’s nature was thought to be more relational and social than 
men’s, or that women’s roles were regularly bound up with familial and social nurturance 
in ways that men’s were less likely to be (though this has often been the case). Quite 
significantly, it also means that philosophical norms or ideals of “individual” expression 
and endeavor were regularly mapped out and theorized in terms of male activities and 
choices in the public realms of work and politics, or in the “private” domain of solitary 
thought, undistracted by the changing particularities of social involvement. It should be 
noted here, of course, that philosophical associations and ideals of male-inflected identity 
and individuality regularly applied only to men of more privileged classes. Thus, insofar 
as gender associations informed traditional understandings of the individual and the 
social, a critical rethinking of these gender associations must also be part of feminist 
reflections on the individual and social in thinking about knowledge, reasoning, and 
epistemology. As is the case with other gender-linked dichotomies, we are cautioned 
against a general endorsement of the social (as “female” or “feminine”) over the 
individual (which is cast as “male” or masculinist) when that runs the risk of reinforcing 
those gender associations and any related sexist assumptions.  
Epistemic individualism, as noted above, usually includes the methodological 
strategy of taking individuals to be the primary knowers or primary epistemic subjects. 
Traditionally, ideal knowers are generic and interchangeable, with common generic 
capacities of reasoning and sense perception. Specifics of social or cultural location—
related to gender, socio-economic class, religious background, or else—are not 
considered pertinent in epistemological investigations. However, feminist and other work 
that is politically sensitive to specifics of cultural location and difference challenges this 
division. In a word, such work troubles the notion that “the social” can be assessed as 
something like an add on to “the individual” (a notion not uncommon in social 
epistemology particularly). Or, to put it another way, this work challenges the notion that, 
given the numerous factors that can go into cognition, understanding, reasoning, and 
knowledge, we can readily divide these into “individual” factors and “social” factors. The 
idea that the social infuses the individual constitutes a recurring them in the examples 
from feminist philosophical work I now proceed to examine. The first examples are 
drawn from feminist examinations of the connections between particular understandings 
of individualism and historically- and culturally-specific understandings of masculinity--
this work helps to situate specific conceptions of epistemic individualism within broader 
cultural understandings of individualism. The later examples pertain to specific 
conceptions of epistemic individualism at the other end of the spectrum, so to speak. 
These connect back to the examples above relating to abstraction: they draw attention to 
accounts of individual reasoning understood in terms of abstraction and completion of 
specific logical/cognitive tasks. 
Feminist work on Descartes provides important insights into the way in which the 
philosophical understandings of epistemic individualism can reflect broader historical and 
cultural moments. Both Susan Bordo (1987) and Naomi Scheman (1993) note the 
relationship between Descartes’ individualism and his skepticism, a relationship they 
both argue lends itself to particular psycho-cultural readings. Profound changes in the 
world of knowledge at the beginning of the scientific revolution, Bordo argues, provide 
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something of a backdrop to the psychologically-inflected themes of uncertainty, 
instability, anxiety, and needs for foundations and certainty that motivate Descartes’ 
work. Though elaborated somewhat differently, Scheman also presents a psycho-cultural 
readings of Descartes’ fears of embodiment and dependence on other people as threats to 
certain knowledge. These readings provide insight into Descartes’ epistemology, 
certainly, but they also encourage us to reflect on what has motivated the compelling grip 
that his work has had on so many epistemologists who have taken his stark individualism 
and skepticism as a kind of starting point in epistemology. They thus challenge many 
standard analyses of Descartes which take his arguments as “timeless, culturally 
disembodied events in some history of ‘talking heads’.” (Bordo 1987, 3) There has been 
some debate about Bordo’s and Scheman’s attributions of “masculinity” to Descartes’ 
epistemic individualism—whether, for instance, an endorsement of object-relations 
theory is required to ground such attributions. But what is perhaps more to the point here 
is the way in which these interrogations into specifics of historical and cultural 
background (whether these specifics relate directly or only tangentially to 
contemporaneous understandings of ideal masculinity) shed light on the way in which 
larger social understandings situate specific conceptions of individualism and the hold 
those conceptions have on theorists who adopt them.  
One can make similar arguments about a potentially misleading narrow focus on 
gender and masculinity in discussions about the epistemic individualism of the traditional 
moral reasoner. Many feminists have argued that this “justice reasoner” also 
encompassed problematic levels of individualism, in this case fleshed out in terms of 
autonomous and independent principles reasoning, as we noted above. Linda Nicholson 
has argued for both historical and cross-cultural analyses in order to better understand the 
“justice reasoner” as a conceptual product of modern Western capitalist society and the 
specific forms of public reason it endorses. (1999) In particular, she argues that 
insufficient critical attention has been given to the ways in which Kohlberg’s conceptions 
of progress (in his notion of “moral progress”) and abstraction incorporate culturally 
specific meanings. Similarly, many feminist theorists now question the cultural 
assumptions embedded in traditional understandings of abstraction and reasoning that led 
previous researchers to conclude, for instance, that non-western children were doing “less 
well” on some of Piaget’s cognitive tests than western children were. As we have noted 
earlier, greater sensitivity to the socially and culturally varied ways in which people can 
interpret, understand, abstract from, and reason about situations and problems elicits 
caution about rank ordering comparisons of intelligence or rationality across different 
cultural contexts. In addition, feminist work in cognitive psychology which draws 
attention to the situational nature of gender (linked to understandings of gender as a 
social formation) also lends support to politically-sensitive analyses of situated cognition. 
Cognitive psychologists and argumentation theorists who design studies of 
specific types of reasoning and logical inference encounter some of the same kinds of 
concerns about how to more precisely demarcate the steps involved in completing 
specific reasoning tasks—including those that seem to be well-defined and self-
contained. There isn’t uniform agreement among these researchers about what 
distinguishes reasoning from productive thinking, for instance. Reasoning can include 
problem-solving and decision-making and can be assessed with a variety of specific 
tasks: verbal analogies, categorical syllogisms, or series completion problems, among 
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others. (Galotti 1989) In addition, modeling the precise sequence of steps involved with 
specific reasoning tasks poses something of a challenge, since people can interpret or 
“encode” the given premises differently, or they can draw differently from assumptions 
and associations in their background knowledge. Cross-cultural studies and studies 
comparing “schooled” and “unschooled” adults reveal interesting results. One study, in 
particular, indicated that unschooled adults “failed to accept the logical task” as given. 
Kathleen Galotti comments on this study as follows: “These adults alter, omit, or add to 
the premises supplied, in order to make the problems more consonant with their own 
knowledge bases and beliefs about the nature of the task… [yet] from their own 
‘translation’ of the premises, they reason elegantly and logically... at least some of the 
variables that influence reasoning, then, have to do with the context in which the task 
occurs.” (Galotti, 337) These studies thus suggest that schooling often involves training 
people into a particular way of understanding or interpreting problems, premises, and 
reasoning steps. This may be only one way among many, and, as we saw earlier, some 
ways of abstracting and carrying out the “core” reasoning task may reflect the 
background knowledge bases and cultural experiences of specific subgroups over others. 
The distinction in philosophy between formal and informal logic (very familiar to people 
at this conference) has, unfortunately, often been used,by formal logicians particularly, to 
promote the idea that formal logic captures “pure” or “core” reasoning or rationality, 
which is valued over the “everyday” or “practical” reasoning that informal logicians 
attend to. Yet, formal logic (particularly in deductive reasoning) at best captures only one 
relatively limited way of abstracting from situations or problems--that is, with respect to 
preserving truth in logical inferences involving propositions of a particular form. 
Cross-cultural studies of a variety of cognitive tasks, as well as studies that are 
sensitive to the political and social-situational nature of gender, thus challenge particular 
understandings of both the abstract-context and the individual-social distinctions in logic 
(philosophy of logic) and in epistemology. Understandings of the cognitive “individual” 
have traditionally been bound up with assessments of a neutral “rational” core, as when 
cognition is theorized in terms of specific steps in abstracting and reasoning that any 
(generic) individual person can perform in completing “the” cognitive task at hand. The 
“social” (as regularly presented in social epistemology, for instance) is then treated as 
something like the penumbra surrounding this rational core—the social context may 
provide data, knowledge gathering tasks may be socially shared, and so on, but the core 
reasoning structure remains, ideally, neutral and similarly available to the individual 
reasoners/knowers involved. Clearly more work needs to be done in order to arrive at 
better understandings of the ways in which politically-inflected aspects of the social and 
cultural inform specific and individual reasoning activities. The kinds of feminist critical 
reformulations of the abstract-context and individual-social distinctions that I have 
examined must, however, be a necessary part of any epistemological or logical project 
that aims to take full account of diversity in reasoning and knowing, not to mention a full 
account of the social and political in all their epistemic manifestations. 
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